I use cointegration techniques to decompose stock market shocks into permanent and transitory shocks, building on the idea that transitory shocks should not have long-run effects on dividends and stock prices. The decomposed shocks improve on existing valuation measures by indicating the extent to which market value is driven by permanent or transitory fluctuations. I then examine the effects of these shocks on several aspects of IPOs, and find that (1) despite the lack of long-run effects on firms' value, more firms go public in response to stronger transitory shocks; (2) firms that go public after stronger transitory shocks underperform their benchmark more severely in the long run; (3) during the book-building period, managers are more likely to limit secondary share sales after stronger transitory shocks; and (4) managers who limit secondary share sales further during the book-building period exhibit more severe long-run underperformance. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that transitory shocks induce more IPOs that opportunistically exploit temporarily higher market valuation than IPOs that finance profitable projects in better market conditions. The findings are also consistent with the hypothesis that managers are more prone to become overconfident after stronger transitory shocks and that the resulting overconfidence leads to longrun underperformance. The decomposition methodology can also be applied to other corporate finance decisions such as SEOs, mergers and investments.
Introduction
Stock prices rise and fall in response to shocks in the market. This fluctuation provides managers with incentives and opportunities to time the market in equity financing. Indeed, a large body of literature has documented that managers attempt to time the market in various forms of equity financing. Lerner (1994) , Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) and Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales (1998) show that the high volume of initial public offerings (hereafter, IPOs) is associated with a high valuation in the stock market. Seasoned equity issuance increases following a period of high returns (Marsh, 1982; Asquith and Mullins Jr., 1986) and repurchases coincide with low valuations (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995) . Also consistent with the notion of equity market timing, firms issue relatively more equity than debt before a bear market begins (Baker and Wurgler, 2000) . In short, managers try to issue equity at high prices and repurchase at low prices.
However, note that the current high or low prices, on which the decision of equity financing is essentially based, can be either permanent or transitory depending on the characteristics of shocks the prices respond to. For example, innovation in production technology or opening up of a new market improves firms' profitability and this type of shock would bring about higher prices that persist permanently. On the other hand, investing fads or discount-rate news would affect stock prices only temporarily. Up until now, there has been little emphasis on making a distinction between shocks that have different persistence. Although market-timing literature implicitly assumes that what managers attempt to take advantage of is a transitory shock rather than a permanent one, the empirical analyses in existing papers do not actually distinguish permanent and transitory shocks. Little emphasis does not mean, however, that it may well be neglected. In fact, the distinction is crucial to better understand the actual practice of equity financing and to test competing hypotheses.
To explore possibly distinct roles of permanent and transitory shocks, this paper decomposes stock market shocks into permanent and transitory shocks using cointegration analyses. Then I examine the effects of the decomposed shocks on managers' equity financing decision using IPO data. I also examine how managers' expectations on their firms' prospects change following the shocks, and what implications the shocks have for IPO firms' long-run performance. To my knowledge, this paper is the first study that explicitly distinguishes shocks based on their persistence and applies the shocks to the context of corporate finance.
Throughout the paper, a permanent shock is defined as one that has long-run effects on market-wide dividends and stock prices, whereas a transitory shock is one whose effects on them eventually vanish. That is, the shocks are distinguished by their degree of persistence, not by their origins. The decomposition is carried out using the fact that the time series of log dividends and log stock prices are cointegrated.
1 This means that log dividends and log prices are individually non-stationary, but a proper linear combination of them (also known as a cointegrating error) becomes stationary. Due to the property of a stationary process, the cointegrating error is mean-reverting. That means that if a shock deviates the cointegrating error from its mean (e.g., a hike in prices with dividends unchanged), the error reverts to its mean in the long run. If the mean reversion occurs through the variable that originally causes the deviation (a decline in prices, in the aforementioned example), the levels of dividends and stock prices would be the same as before, and the shock is classified as transitory. On the contrary, if the mean reversion occurs through the other variable (a rise in dividends, in the aforementioned example), both variables would end up in different levels and the shock is classified as permanent. In other words, a shock that shifts both dividends and prices is permanent, while a shock that fluctuates only one variable is transitory. The idea of the cointegrated log dividends and log prices is similar to Campbell and Shiller (1998) , but this paper goes a couple of steps further. Campbell and Shiller (1998) discuss the stability of dividend-price ratios and empirically show that the ratios forecast future changes in stock prices. Although they don't mention cointegration, their main point can be restated that log dividends and log prices are cointegrated and a cointegrating error is mostly corrected by log prices rather than log dividends. While they only show a relationship between price changes and dividend-price ratios by running simple linear regressions, I gauge how prices and dividends are jointly responding to a cointegrating error by running a vector error-correction model (hereafter, VECM). The results of the VECM estimation enable us to see the extent to which current price and dividend changes are attributed to permanent and transitory shocks. Cochrane (1994) also examines the cointegration between log dividends and log prices using a VECM and concludes that dividend innovations are permanent and price innovations are transitory. Since not all dividend innovations are permanent nor all price innovations transitory, his conclusion is a convenient approximate description but not sheer truth. This paper differs from Cochrane (1994) in that I add an explicit decomposition process to make sure that the effects of a permanent shock and a transitory shock indeed persist and vanish, respectively, in the long run.
The decomposition results show that the methodology used in this paper effectively differentiates stock market shocks that have different persistence, and the decomposed shocks deliver richer information about stock market valuation than other commonly used valuation measures such as dividend-price ratios and market returns. The dividendprice ratio provides a big picture about overall market valuation in the long run, but due to its high persistence, it cannot effectively reflect latest changes in the valuation. On the other hand, since decomposed shocks show significant variation even in the short run, they can better indicate contemporary information of marginal changes in market valuation. The decomposed shocks also give better insights than market returns. Although the time series of market returns can indicate whether the market has been (2004) empirically apply this methodology to data of consumption and wealth.
valued high or low, it cannot indicate how much of the recent return is caused by a permanent shock and how much of it is caused by a transitory shock. The decomposed shocks, in contrast, can directly indicate the extent to which recent market valuation is driven by permanent or transitory fluctuations.
Permanent and transitory shocks in the stock market incentivize and influence managers differently regarding IPOs. A permanent shock that improves firms' profitability may generate new investment opportunities, which increases firms' capital demand. At the same time, however, the improved profitability may make equity financing and consequent ownership dilution more costly than before. In this way, the incentive to issue equity following a permanent shock is indefinite. On the other hand, temporary high market valuation due to a transitory shock is clearly conducive to raising money through equity dilution. In addition, given that managers' expectations can be subject to change under the influence of market conditions (Israelsen, 2010) , permanent and transitory shocks may play different roles in managers' forming expectations.
Moreover, consequences of equity financing can be different depending on which shock drives the decision. Issuing equity after a permanent shock may well be done to finance potential investment opportunities created by the shock. Equity issuance after a transitory shock, on the other hand, is likely to be motivated with the intention of benefiting existing shareholders at the cost of new shareholders. Therefore, while the equity market timing after permanent shocks could benefit not only existing shareholders but also the economy by financing potentially value-adding investment opportunities, equity issuance motivated by transitory shocks may only redistribute wealth from new shareholders to existing shareholders. These possibilities imply that high or low market valuation caused by different shocks needs to be analyzed separately to better evaluate their effects on equity financing.
Having decomposed permanent and transitory shocks from post-World War II data of market-wide dividends and stock prices, I examine the role of the shocks in U.S. common share IPOs from 1970 to 2010. I focus especially on the role of transitory shocks because more clear and interesting implications emerge from transitory shocks. As will be discussed in more detail in the following section, transitory shocks are a strong driving force in IPOs although a transitory shock by itself does not change firms' value in the long run. Also, since a transitory shock changes stock prices in the short run but not in the long run, it may give managers misleading perception. In contrast, permanent shockdriven IPOs have relatively straightforward motivation and implications. Therefore, it is important to thoroughly understand the role of transitory shocks to exactly evaluate the economic significance of IPOs. IPOs have long been believed to contribute value to the economy by channeling funds to creative companies, pushing innovation forward, and promoting entrepreneurship. But if it turns out that most IPOs attempt mere redistribution of wealth by exploiting transitory shocks, the alleged economic significance of IPOs would be an overstatement. In addition, if it turns out that managers in IPO firms are prone to mistakenly change their expectations under the influence of transitory shocks and this mistake is associated with their poor long-run performance, this possibility of being overconfident should act as a warning to managers.
Regarding IPOs, main findings are fourfold. First, despite the lack of long-run effects on firms' value, more firms go public in response to stronger transitory shocks. Second, firms that go public after stronger transitory shocks underperform their benchmark more severely than otherwise identical IPOs in the long run. Third, during the bookbuilding period, managers are more likely to limit secondary share sales after stronger transitory shocks. Last, if managers limit secondary share sales further during the book-building period, their firms exhibit more severe long-run underperformance than otherwise identical IPOs. The effects of transitory shocks turn out to be strong and clearly distinguished from those of permanent shocks. The unique role of transitory shocks proves the importance of the decomposition of permanent and transitory shocks. I repeat the analyses using industry-wide data as well and find the heterogeneous effects of the shocks across different industries. Although managers' attempt to take advantage of temporary market valuation is not new, this paper has significance in that it identifies the time and industries in which managers' opportunistic behavior is particularly likely.
The first two findings are consistent with the hypothesis that stronger transitory shocks induce more IPOs that opportunistically exploit temporarily higher market valuation than IPOs that have been looking to finance profitable investment projects in better market conditions. Note that a permanent shock raises both dividends and prices. Due to the trade-off between higher proceeds from increased prices and higher foregone future dividends, managers do not have a strong incentive to go public after a positive permanent shock unless additional attractive investment opportunities are created by the shock. A transitory shock without such a trade-off, on the other hand, provides managers with a strong incentive to go public. Firms that go public following stronger transitory shocks could be firms that have waited for better market conditions to finance profitable projects. However, the finding that IPOs driven by stronger transitory shocks underperform more severely in the long run implies that managers' IPO timing is mostly motivated by a bid to benefit existing shareholders rather than by capital demand for investment.
The last two findings are consistent with the hypothesis that managers are more prone to become overconfident after stronger transitory shocks and the resulting overconfidence leads to their long-run underperformance. Since ownership is a primary concern of managers, the degree of ownership dilution through the offering must have been very carefully considered from the beginning. Therefore, other things being equal, there is no a priori reason to change the degree of dilution during the book-building period. In case that stock market valuation becomes temporarily more favorable due to a stronger transitory shock during the book-building period, however, a rational manager could be better off by increasing the degree of dilution further. Interestingly, the empirical results show that managers are more likely to decrease, rather than increase, secondary share sales after stronger transitory shocks. This implies that under the in-fluence of transitory shocks, managers' expectations of their firms' prospects change in a way that they want to keep more ownership. Together with the fact that managers who decrease secondary share sales during the book-building period underperform more severely in the long run, this finding supports the hypothesis of overconfident managers.
This study contributes to corporate finance literature in several ways. First and foremost, this paper provides a novel framework for empirical corporate finance. Note that the decomposition methodology used in this paper can be applied to most corporate finance decision-making based on stock market valuation. Besides equity financing, mergers and acquisitions are known to be largely motivated by stock market valuation (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) . Baker (2009) notes that market conditions play an important role in dictating corporate finance and investment. Previous literature studies the effect of market valuation on corporate finance decision-making using various measures such as the level of stock prices (Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist, 1994) , stock returns (Marsh, 1982; Asquith and Mullins Jr., 1986; Baker and Wurgler, 2000) , and market-to-book ratios (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen, 1995; Lerner, 1994; Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales, 1998) . However, these articles do not explicitly distinguish the effect of high valuation caused by a permanent shock from that by a transitory shock. The decomposition methodology enables us to separately examine the role of permanent and transitory shocks, and enhances our understanding of how the stock market influences corporate finance decision-making.
Second, this paper sheds light on managerial overconfidence by suggesting a new measure of overconfidence and its potential origin. So far, managers' overconfidence has been mostly assumed exogenously rather than derived endogenously in the sense that a manager is or becomes overconfident without explaining why (Heaton, 2002; Tate, 2005, 2008; Camerer and Malmendier, 2007) .
2 This paper argues that changes in the degree of dilution during the book-building period can reflect managerial overconfidence, and empirically shows that managers are more likely to behave as if they were overconfident after stronger transitory shocks. This finding provides a channel through which managers' expectations are affected by macroeconomic shocks and suggests that transitory shocks in the stock market may be a potential source of managerial overconfidence.
Lastly, the findings enhance our understanding regarding the stylized facts in IPOs: IPO waves and long-run IPO underperformance. Since Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and Ritter (1984) addressed the phenomenon of IPO waves, many researches have tried to rationalize the apparent excess of IPO volume volatility both theoretically (Pastor and Veronesi, 2005; Benninga, Helmantel, and Sarig, 2005; Alti, 2005) and empirically (Lerner, 1994; Rajan and Servaes, 2004; Lowry, 2003) . But these studies are still far from perfect. Also, the existence of long-run IPO underperformance, as well as the reasons for such underperformance, has been disputed (Ritter, 1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Brav and Gompers, 1997; Gompers and Lerner, 2003) . This paper presents a complementary explanation for the stylized facts by showing that transitory stock market shocks significantly account for both IPO waves and long-run IPO underperformance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how permanent and transitory shocks incentivize managers and develops empirical predictions. Section 3 describes data, and Section 4 explains the methodology of permanent-transitory decomposition and presents the decomposition results. In Section 5, I test the predictions and interpret the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
Empirical Predictions
This section discusses how permanent and transitory shocks incentivize managers on decisions about going public and ownership dilution, and develops empirical predictions.
3
For simplicity, I make the following assumptions. A manager's interest is exactly aligned with that of existing shareholders so that there is no agency problem. Shocks in the stock market are applied not only to public firms but also to private firms. To guarantee internal solutions, the amount of IPO proceeds rises at a decreasing rate as a manager dilutes more ownership through the IPO. During the book-building period, some managers become overconfident under the influence of positive stock market shocks. Some permanent shocks bring about new investment opportunities. Finally, a manager maximizes her utility, which increases in IPO proceeds and decreases in foregone dividends from her firm.
Before I discuss the effects of the shocks, note that there can be two types of transitory shocks. One type is a transitory price shock after which stock prices rise initially but come down to the original level over time. The other type is a transitory dividend shock, which fluctuates only dividends. A permanent shock does not have such classification because it raises both prices and dividends permanently. In the later section, I empirically show that transitory shocks in the U.S. stock market materialize through fluctuation in prices rather than dividends. For this reason, I will refer to a transitory price shock as the transitory shock.
Regarding the decision on going public, permanent and transitory shocks incentivize managers differently as follows. When the stock market is valued higher after a positive permanent shock, a manager can charge a higher offer price and raise greater proceeds, but she has to forego future dividends that also become higher after the shock. Due to the trade-off between proceeds and dividends, a stronger permanent shock will not provide managers with a stronger incentive to go public in itself. A permanent shock will work as a strong driving force for IPOs only if it creates additional investment opportunities and increases managers' capital demand. Unlike a permanent shock, a transitory shock only fluctuates prices, not dividends, so there is no trade-off between greater proceeds and greater dividends. Therefore, managers will have a stronger incentive to go public after a stronger transitory shock to take advantage of the short window of temporarily higher valuation in the stock market. From this argument, we obtain the following prediction: Prediction 1. More firms go public in response to stronger transitory shocks. However, IPO volume does not necessarily increase after stronger permanent shocks unless additional investment opportunities accompanying the shock sufficiently increase managers' capital demand.
Managers' stronger incentive for IPOs after stronger transitory shocks does not necessarily mean that all IPO decisions arise only from an opportunistic motive. IPOs that time stronger transitory shocks could be firms that go public to meet the capital demand for investment in better market conditions (hereafter, smart IPOs). They could also be firms that go public even without any concrete capital demand merely to exploit temporarily higher market valuation (hereafter, opportunistic IPOs). Although we are ex ante agnostic on which type of IPOs should be more sensitive to transitory shocks, it is possible to ex post infer which type of IPOs have been more prevalent because the two types of IPOs have different implications for long-run performance. While smart IPOs may well perform better than or at least as well as other IPOs in the long run, opportunistic IPOs are likely to exhibit long-run underperformance (D'Souza, 2008) . Therefore, we obtain the following prediction:
Prediction 2. If stronger transitory shocks result in disproportionally more (less) opportunistic IPOs than smart IPOs, firms that go public after stronger transitory shocks will on average have poorer (better) long-run performance than otherwise identical IPOs.
As for the decision on the degree of ownership dilution, I take into account the possibility that managers change their expectations (Israelsen, 2010) and sometimes become overconfident during the book-building period under the influence of stock market shocks.
4 A manager is overconfident if she believes her company is undervalued. 5 On occasion, managers learn how favorable the market is during the book-building period and revise the specifics of the offering such as the offer price and the size of the offering. This revision can lead to change in the degree of ownership dilution through the offering. For example, if a manager decides to offer more secondary shares than the amount initially filed with the SEC, this revision leads to an increase in the degree of dilution.
4 I can also incorporate this possibility in the stage of the IPO decision, but this consideration does not qualitatively change Prediction 1 and Prediction 2.
5 In Heaton (2002) , optimistic managers overestimate the probability of good cash flows from existing projects and high payoffs from new investment opportunities. In Tate (2005, 2008) , overconfident managers overestimate their ability to create value. The common implication from these definitions is that managers believe their firms should have greater values than investors assess.
6 For the detail of the book-building period, see Wilhelm Jr. (1999) .
Given that ownership is of foremost importance for managers (Brau and Fawcett, 2006) , it must have been carefully determined from the beginning. Unlike the offer price, which can be naturally revised as the firm's value is gradually revealed during the bookbuilding period, there is little a priori reason to change the degree of dilution unless there are clear incentives to do so. Therefore, changes in the degree of dilution can be a measure that reflects changes in managers' expectations on their firms' prospects.
Once the decision to go public is made, managers decide how much ownership they will dilute through the offering. By diluting more ownership, they can raise more IPO proceeds but they have to forego more dividends as well. Taking this trade-off into account, managers optimally decide the degree of dilution that maximizes their utility, and file the optimal number of shares with the SEC. A stock market shock that occurs after the filing can alter managers' utility and give incentives to revise the degree of dilution.
A permanent shock, which increases both dividends and prices, does not provide a strong incentive for a rational manager to change the degree of dilution because of the trade-off between IPO proceeds and dividends. In contrast, a transitory shock does not have such a trade-off and has a clearer and stronger prediction about the direction of the dilution change. A rational manager can be strictly better off by diluting more ownership after a stronger transitory shock. For a rational manager, it is never optimal to decrease ownership dilution after a stronger transitory shock.
If any shock makes managers overconfident, they will believe that their shares are more valuable than the market evaluates. Because overconfident managers consider dilution of ownership more costly than rational managers, they will not dilute as much ownership as rational managers would. In an extreme case of overconfidence, managers might decrease, rather than increase, the degree of dilution even after a stronger transitory shock.
One may argue that under asymmetric information, managers may rationally decide to decrease ownership dilution after a stronger transitory shock for signaling purposes (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . Since many firms are expected to go public after such a shock as shown in Prediction 1, managers in "good" firms may try to distinguish themselves from those in "bad" firms by intentionally taking a costly action. Although it is ex ante unclear whether diluting less ownership after a stronger transitory shock is due to managerial overconfidence or signaling purposes, we can ex post infer which causes the change in the ownership dilution because the two potential motives have different implications for long-run performance. Since overconfident managers are more likely to undertake value-destroying projects than rational managers (Malmendier and Tate, 2008) , if the decision of decreasing dilution is made by overconfident managers, the IPOs should exhibit poorer long-run performance than other IPOs. In contrast, if the decision is made for rational reasons such as signaling, the IPOs should perform better than or at least as well as other IPOs in the long run. From these arguments, the following predictions derive: Prediction 3. Provided that signaling purposes are not significant in reality, a rational manager may increase -but never decrease -the degree of ownership dilution during the book-building period after stronger transitory shocks; On the contrary, a manager who becomes overconfident could decrease the degree of dilution after such shocks.
Prediction 4. If a manager rationally decides to decrease the degree of dilution after stronger transitory shocks, her firm will perform better than or at least as well as otherwise identical IPOs in the long run. In contrast, if such a decision is the result of managerial overconfidence, the firm will have poorer long-run performance.
Data
The data are collected from multiple sources. The gross return of the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ composite index with and without dividends (RETD and RETX, respectively) are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). From these return data, the time series of market-wide dividends and stock prices are generated.
7 The sample covers the post-World War II period (1948Q1 to 2010Q4). The generated time series of dividends and prices are used in the decomposition of permanent and transitory shocks through the estimation of a VECM.
The U.S. common share IPOs from 1970 to 2010 are identified from the Security Data Company (SDC). For comparability, I follow IPO literature by excluding American Depository Receipts (ADRs), closed-end funds (CEFs), real estate investment trusts (REITs), and unit offerings, which leaves 10,049 IPOs. The available variables in the database include the offer price, the filed low/mid/high prices, the number of primary and secondary shares filed/offered, the SIC code, etc. The number of quarterly IPOs is obtained from this initial database, which allows us to examine the effects of permanent and transitory shocks on IPO volume through time-series regressions.
For cross-sectional analyses, stock information for each IPO is retrieved from the CRSP and matched to the SDC database. From the IPO price history and the market returns, I compute the market-adjusted three-year holding period return for each IPO firm.
8 The market-adjusted return is the difference between the IPO holding period return and the market return for the same holding period. In case a firm is delisted before its third anniversary, I use the closing price in the day of delisting to compute the holding period return, and subtract the market return for the same period for market adjustment. The observations without valid information are dropped. Also, due to 7 The exact procedure of the data generation is as follows. Consider a portfolio composed of all stocks in NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Without loss of generality, assume the market value of the portfolio is 1 at time 0 (P 0 = 1). The subsequent prices and dividends are determined such that
8 I consider 252 business days as a year. The holding period return is computed with the closing price in the first trading day and that in the 756th trading day. Since most IPOs do not pay dividends in their first three years, I consider the ratio of the prices to be the gross holding period return.
the incompleteness of data in 1970s and the computation of three-year holding period returns, the IPOs before 1980 and after 2007 are excluded from the sample, which leaves 6,046 IPOs from 1980 to 2007. The computed returns are used in analyzing IPO long-run underperformance.
The degree of ownership dilution is measured using the pre-IPO shares outstanding and the number of shares offered by original shareholders (secondary shares). Specifically, I use the ratio of the secondary share sales to the pre-IPO shares outstanding as the measure of dilution. Since the original number of secondary shares filed with the SEC can be changed during the book-building period, the initially planned dilution (Dilute P ) implied by filed shares can be different from the actual dilution (Dilute A ) computed from actually offered shares. The change in the dilution (∆Dilute) enables us to examine how managers' expectations would be affected by permanent and transitory shocks. The variables are defined as follows:
Filed Secondary Shares Pre-IPO Shares Outstanding ,
Several variables known to be relevant in IPO studies are controlled. Lowry (2003) shows that the real sales growth, equally weighted future market returns, closed-end fund discount rates, and the market-wide market-to-book ratio have explanatory power for the fluctuation in IPO volume. Following the definitions of each variable in Lowry (2003) , I obtained the data of sales and market-to-book ratios for all public firms from the Compustat. I downloaded the closed-end fund discount rates from professor Jeffrey Wurgler's website.
10 As for the IPO long-run performance, firm size and venture capital-or private equity-backing status are relevant (Brav and Gompers, 1997) . This information is readily available in the SDC-CRSP merged database.
Lastly, I classify each IPO into one of the five industries -high technology, manufacturing, health care, consumer goods, and others -in order to repeat the whole analyses using the industry-wide data instead of the market-wide data. Following Fama and French (1997) , the classification is based on the four-digit SIC code. The criterion is 9 Alternatively, the change in ownership dilution can be measured using post-IPO ownership, Pre-IPO shares outstanding − Secondary shares Pre-IPO shares outstanding + Primary shares . As before, since the planned post-IPO ownership (Own P ) can be different from the actual one (Own A ), the difference of them (∆Dilute2 = Own P − Own A ) reflects how managers' expectations are revised during the book-building period. Post-IPO ownership has its merits and demerits. It directly indicates how original shareholders' ownership retention is changed during the book-building period, but it is largely dependent on the number of primary shares issued, which is not always under control of managers. The use of this alternative measure does not change the analysis results qualitatively, which demonstrates their robustness. The data are not reported in this paper but available upon request.
10 http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/ obtained from Professor Kenneth French's Data Library.
11 The industry-wide analyses enable us to test the predictions in more detail and to check the robustness of the tests. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics and exact definitions of all variables used in this paper. Panel A reports the summary statistics of cross-sectional variables such as the holding period return of each IPO, the corresponding market return, and the secondary share revisions during the book-building period. Panel B describes the summary statistics of time series variables aggregated to quarterly frequencies such as IPO volume and permanent and transitory shocks in each quarter.
Not only do the summary statistics confirm already-known stylized facts but they also reveal new interesting phenomena. The large standard deviation of IPO volume (IPOV ) is consistent with the excess volatility in IPO volume, and the negative average market-adjusted holding period return (MHPR3 ) indicates the well-known IPO longrun underperformance. The changes in the degree of dilution during the book-building period, on the other hand, have drawn relatively little attention.
12 According to the summary statistics, the changes in the degree of dilution are observed in a substantial number of IPOs. 32.48% of total IPOs experience secondary share revisions during the book building. Among those IPOs that made any revisions, 13% decides to limit secondary share sales whereas 87% offers more secondary shares. I analyze how shocks in the stock market are related with the changes in the degree of dilution in more detail in Section 5.
Permanent-Transitory Decomposition
This section explains a methodology that systematically decomposes shocks in cointegrated time series into permanent and transitory shocks using a vector error correction model (VECM), and applies the methodology to data of dividends and prices. The procedure follows Gonzalo and Ng (2001) . They propose this econometric methodology but do not apply it to an empirical work. Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) apply the methodology to data of consumption and wealth and investigate how much of the forecast error variance of each variable is attributed to permanent and transitory shocks, but unlike this paper, they do not use the shocks as independent variables to explain other relevant phenomena.
Methodology
Let X t be an n-dimensional vector of integrated (I(1)) time series. Since every covariancestationary time series can be written as a moving average process with infinite degrees (MA(∞)) by the Wold representation theorem (Wold, 1954) , X t has a following movingaverage representation:
where
is an n × n coefficient matrix, and e t is an n-dimensional innovation vector satisfying E[e t ] = 0, cov(e t ) = Ω and E[e t e s ] = 0 for t = s. If X t is cointegrated with a set of cointegrating vectors, α n×r , then X t can be represented as a VECM by the Granger representation theorem:
where γ is an n × r error-correction coefficient,
and Γ t is an n × n coefficient matrix. This representation shows that the current change in the cointegrated time series (∆X t ) depends not only on its current innovation (e t ) and its past changes (∆X t−i , i > 0) but also on the cointegrating error (α X t−1 ). γ indicates how each variable in X t responds to the error.
This VECM representation provides information necessary for the decomposition. A shock is defined as a permanent shock (η P t ) if lim h→∞ ∂Et[X t+h ] ∂η P t = 0, and as a transitory
is an expectation conditional on information available at t. The fact that B(1) has rank n − r implies that there are n − r permanent shocks and r transitory shocks in this system. Without loss of generality, the shocks are ordered so that the first n − r shocks have permanent effects and the last r shocks have transitory effects: η t = (η P t , η T t )
. The permanent and transitory shocks are obtained by appropriately transforming the original innovation (e t ). The cointegrating vector (α) and the error correction coefficient (γ) in the VECM representation provide the guidance for this transformation. Specifically, let G = (γ ⊥ , α)
, where γ ⊥ is an n × (n − r) matrix such that γ ⊥ γ = 0 (n−r)×1 , then the transformation of the original innovation by G proves to be the unorthogonalized permanent and transitory shocks (u t ).
15 This decomposition exists as long as G is non-singular. Incorporating the decomposition, the original Wold representation is rewritten as follows:
13 Deterministic components are irrelevant for analyses and abstracted for notational simplicity. 14 X t is said to be cointegrated with rank r if B(1) has rank n − r and there exist two n × r matrices, α and γ, such that α B(1) = 0, B(1)γ = 0, and the matrices are of rank r. See Engle and Granger (1987) for more details.
15 This is the point where this paper goes further than Campbell and Shiller (1998) . They argue that the relationship between dividends and prices are stable over a long horizon, and show that dividendprice ratios forecast future changes in prices, not dividends. Their work is essentially the estimation of γ with the restrictions of Γ = 0 and α = (1, −1) using the data of log dividends and log prices. Not only does this paper estimate γ, but it also decomposes permanent and transitory shocks using the estimated γ.
and cov(u t ) = GΩG ≡ Σ. The intuition behind the decomposition is as follows. Note that γ = (γ 1 , γ 2 , ..., γ n ) is the error correction coefficient. Therefore, a large value of γ j indicates that the jth variable in X t significantly corrects the cointegrating error, which implies that a current innovation in the jth variable is significantly reverted later; on the contrary, a small γ j indicates that the jth variable in X t is quite independent of the error and autonomously evolves. For this reason, a large (small) value of γ j should assign the jth innovation a small (large) weight in forming permanent shocks, and this is exactly what γ ⊥ in G does. α in G guarantees that transitory shocks have no long-run effects on the level of X t .
Note that the decomposed permanent and transitory shocks are unorthogonalized in the sense that the shocks can be mutually correlated. In other words, the off-thediagonal elements in the variance-covariance matrix, Σ, are not necessarily zero. To assess the pure effects of each shock, the shocks need to be orthogonalized. The orthogonalization is achieved by the conventional Cholesky decomposition. Let H be the Cholesky decomposition of Σ so that Σ = HH and H is a lower triangular matrix. Then the transformation of the unorthogonalized decomposed shocks by H −1 turns out to be the orthogonalized decomposed shocks (η t ). The final form of the Wold representation is written as follows:
and cov(η t ) = I. The equation (1) and (4) show that the current change in the variables (∆X t ) can be expressed as a function of the history of permanent and transitory shocks (η t ) as well as innovations in each variable (e t ).
Application
In this paper, I apply the decomposition methodology to the time series of dividends and stock prices (n = 2), in which there is one cointegrating vector (r = 1). From the data, one-dimensional time series of permanent shocks and transitory shocks are respectively obtained.
There are many other economic variables known to be cointegrated, but I use dividends and stock prices in this paper for two reasons. First, the data can be easily generated from return data as described in Section 3. The method is applied not only to market-wide returns but also to firm-level or industry-wide returns, which facilitates the industry-wide analyses as well as the market-wide ones. Second and more importantly, dividends and prices are the most relevant variables that managers take into account in the context of IPOs. Managers want to raise as much money as possible through IPOs, but at the same time, they want to keep as much benefits from their firms as possible as well (Brau and Fawcett, 2006) . Prices and dividends well capture these concerns of managers because they are directly related to the IPO proceeds and the benefit. Therefore, the shocks in these variables are appropriate in explaining managerial decision-making about IPOs.
The time series of dividends and prices are depicted in Figure 1 . The figure graphically confirms that the two time series are individually non-stationary but share a common trend.
16 Figure 2 depicts the decomposed permanent and transitory shocks for the period of 1960Q1 to 2010Q4. The figure also compares the shocks with the quarterly return of the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ composite index for the same period. Note that the shocks are more informative than the market returns. Although the time series of market returns can indicate whether the market has been valued high or low, it cannot indicate how much of a return at a point in time is caused by a permanent shock and how much is by a transitory shock. The decomposed shocks, in contrast, can directly indicate the extent to which the market valuation at a point in time is driven by a permanent shock or by a transitory shock. For example, during the second half in 2010, Panel B shows that the market returns are positive and high, but it does not indicate in itself how long the high market valuation will persist. The decomposed shocks in Panel A show that the high returns are solely driven by high transitory shocks, which implies that the high valuation would be temporary. Figure 3 depicts the moving averages of the shocks and compares them with the level of the logged NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ composite index. This comparison graphically confirms that the methodology is actually effective in differentiating permanent and transitory shocks. During the mid 1980s and the late 1990s, the stock market was all characterized as a bull market with its prolonged rally, but the decomposition enables us to discern that the bull markets originate from different types of shocks. While the bull markets in the late 1990s were caused more by transitory shocks than permanent shocks, the bull market in the mid 1980s is brought mostly by permanent shocks. This reflects the fact that log dividends increased proportionally to log prices in the mid 1980s, but not in the late 1990s. As suggested by the shocks, the high market valuation in the late 1990s turns out transitory.
17
The decomposed shocks deliver richer information about stock market valuation than other commonly used valuation measures such as dividend-price ratios, price-earning ratios and book-to-market ratios. Figure 4 depicts the time series of these ratios. Although these measures provide a big picture about overall market valuation and successfully identify the periods of high/low market valuation in the long run, they are too persistent to effectively reflect the marginal changes in the valuation in the short run. The highly fluctuating decomposed shocks, on the other hand, can indicate contemporary information about marginal changes in market valuation even in the short run. Figure 5 shows how dividends and stock prices are reacting over time in response to a one standard deviation shock. The top two figures are the impulse response functions to a permanent shock, while the bottom two figures are to a transitory shock. The figures indicate that transitory shocks in the post-WWII U.S. stock market are indeed in the form of shocks on prices rather than shocks on dividends as mentioned in Section 2.
This decomposition methodology in this paper has some desirable advantages over conventional vector autoregression (VAR) analyses such as Bernanke and Mihov (1998) or simple VECM analyses such as Cochrane (1994) . In general, VAR analyses view identified structural shocks as innovations to the variables in the system based on a priori assumptions. However, it is hard in reality to exactly know the origin of the shocks, and the analyses based on the assumptions are subject to misinterpretation. The methodology used in this paper is free from this kind of limitation because the shocks are identified by the degree of persistence, regardless of their origins.
18 Cochrane (1994) identifies the shocks on the dividends-prices system using the VECM specification as in this paper, and finds that the shocks on dividends have almost permanent effects while the shocks on stock prices have almost transitory effects. However, his analyses are simple orthogonalization of innovations, not decomposition of innovations into permanent and transitory shocks per se. Indeed, his findings are not robust to a different sample period. This paper explicitly includes the decomposition process (through the matrix G) as well as the orthogonalization process (though the matrix H −1 ) to make sure the resulting permanent and transitory shocks in fact have lasting and vanishing effects, respectively, in the long run.
Results
This section applies the decomposed stock market shocks to IPOs. First I test the predictions developed in Section 2 using market-wide data and interprets the test results. Then I repeat the analyses using industry-wide data, which provides detailed insight into the role of the shocks.
Tests of Predictions
First, I test Prediction 1, which states that more firms go public in response to stronger transitory shocks. It also states that, by contrast, IPO volume does not necessarily increase after stronger permanent shocks unless additional investment opportunities accompanying the shocks sufficiently increase managers' capital demand. The IPO volume (IP OV t ) in this paper is defined as the number of IPOs at quarter t deflated by the number of public firms (in thousands) at the previous quarter.
19 Figure 6 shows the quarterly IPO volume for the period of 1970Q1 to 2010Q4.
Having computed the IPO volume as the dependent variable, I run the following time series regressions:
where P shock t (T shock t ) is a permanent (transitory) shock that occurs at quarter t. The shocks are estimated as discussed in Section 4. To take both contemporaneous and delayed effects of the shocks into account, I control current and past values of each shock up to four previous quarters.
20 As in Lowry (2003) , I also control market conditions (measured by market-wide market-to-book ratios and past real market returns), managers' capital demand (measured by future sales growth), and investor sentiment (measured by future real market returns and closed-end fund discount rates).
21 All regressions take the residual serial correlation into account by controlling the lagged value of the dependent variable. Lastly, the first-quarter dummy is included to control apparent seasonality. Table 2 shows the results of the regressions with various specifications. The results are consistent with Prediction 1. I find that current and past transitory shocks have statistically significant positive effects on IPO volume in every specification, whereas permanent shocks lack such effects when all relevant factors are controlled. The effects of transitory shocks are economically significant as well. On average, a one standard deviation transitory shock increases the total number of public firms through IPOs by 0.31% over a year after the shock. Roughly speaking, more than 23 additional IPOs are induced on average by the shock over a year.
22
Note that Prediction 1 does not state that permanent shocks are always insignificant. IPO volume could have increased after permanent shocks if managers were attracted by additional investment opportunities that accompany the shocks. The insignificant effect of permanent shocks implies that in the market level, investment opportunities are not sufficiently created by permanent shocks and managers don't have enough incentives to 19 Analyses with the raw numbers do not change the results qualitatively. 20 In general, if a variable is estimated in the first stage regression and the estimated variable is used as an independent variable in the second stage regression, the standard error in the second stage should be appropriately adjusted. However, Pagan (1984) shows that the adjustment is not necessary if the testing null hypothesis is that the estimated variable has no effect. Throughout the section, I test the null hypotheses that the estimated shocks have no effect. Therefore, there is no need to adjust the standard errors.
21 See Table 1 for the detailed definitions of the variables used in this section. 22 0.31% is obtained by the sum of all coefficients of current and past transitory shocks, divided by 1,000. The average number of public firms listed in NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ is 7,476.56 for the sample period from 1969Q4 to 2010Q3. 0.31% of 7,476.56 is 23.18. go public following the shocks.
23 The distinguished effects of permanent and transitory shocks confirm the importance of the permanent-transitory decomposition.
I turn to Prediction 2, which enables us to determine which type of IPOs are more motivated by transitory shocks: smart IPOs vs. opportunistic IPOs. If stronger transitory shocks stimulate more opportunistic IPOs than smart IPOs, then the IPOs motivated by transitory shocks will have on average poorer long-run performance than otherwise identical IPOs. In contrast, if there are more smart IPOs than opportunistic IPOs following stronger transitory shocks, the implication for the long-run performance will be the opposite. To test Prediction 2, I run the following cross-sectional regressions:
where MHP R3 i is the IPO i's market-adjusted three-year holding period returns and P shock i,−k (T shock i,−k ) is a permanent (transitory) shock that has occurred k quarters before the firm i goes public. The sign and significance of τ k will indicate which hypothesis is more consistent with the empirical results. Other control variables include firm-specific factors (ShareOffered, Proceeds, InitialRet, MktCap, etc.) and market conditions during the book-building period (HotIPO and ColdIPO). Table 3 shows that firms that go public after stronger transitory shocks underperform the benchmark more severely in the long run than otherwise identical IPOs. The results are statistically and economically significant and robust to various specifications. For example, the fifth column of Table 3 indicates that an IPO motivated by two consecutive quarters of one standard deviation transitory shocks has a lower three-year holding period return by 11.3%p on average than otherwise identical IPOs. This finding supports the hypothesis that stronger transitory shocks induce disproportionally more IPOs that opportunistically exploit temporarily higher market valuation than IPOs that have been looking to finance profitable project in better market conditions.
Although managers' attempt to take advantage of temporary market valuation has been widely documented so far, this paper has significance in that it identifies the time in which managers' opportunistic behavior is particularly likely. Note that there are substantial waves within a IPO wave (Figure 6 ). It is hard to explain this variation with commonly used valuation measures such as dividend-price ratios, price-earning ratios, and book-to-market ratios due to their high persistence. Since the decomposed permanent and transitory shocks show substantial variation even in the short run, the analyses equipped with the shocks provide a finer picture about managers' opportunistic attempts.
Now I shift gears and analyze how permanent and transitory shocks affect managers' expectations on their firms' prospects and what implications the change in expectations have on their long-run performance. I examine managers' expectations through changes in the degree of dilution during the IPO book-building period. To do so, I construct dummy variables that indicate managers who change the degree of dilution during the book-building period. DiluteLess i (DiluteM ore i ) indicates managers who decrease (increase) the degree of dilution. Similarly, DiluteSame i indicates managers who make no change in the degree of dilution. Prediction 3 states that rational managers have incentives to increase the degree of dilution if stronger transitory shocks occur during the book-building period. It also states that if managers become overconfident meanwhile, they may decrease, rather than increase, the degree of dilution because they perceive the dilution of ownership is too costly. I test Prediction 3 by running the following multinomial logit regressions:
where I control firm-specific factors and market conditions as well as permanent and transitory shocks to explain the log odds ratios. From the two regressions, we can estimate the log odds ratios and derive the probability of each case as follows:
. Table 4 describes the regression results. Note that in the first regression, the coefficients of transitory shocks (τ L ) are significantly positive, while in the second regression, the coefficients (τ M ) are significantly negative. These results mean that after stronger transitory shocks, the probability of managers' decreasing the degree of dilution becomes greater, while the probability of their increasing the degree of dilution becomes smaller. In other words, managers have a tendency to dilute less after stronger transitory shocks, which is the opposite of what rational managers are expected to do. Recall that a manager can be better off by diluting ownership further after stronger transitory shocks. The results imply that managers' expectations on their firms' prospects become more optimistic after stronger transitory shocks and managers are less willing to dilute their ownership than before. This supports the hypothesis that managers tend to become overconfident after stronger transitory shocks.
Note that the above interpretation of overconfident managers is valid provided that signaling does not play a significant role during the book-building period. As discussed in Section 2, if a manager has an incentive to take seemingly costly actions to signal that she is a "good" type, the decision of diluting less after stronger transitory shocks can be rationalized. Prediction 4 helps us to infer whether such a decision is driven by overconfidence or by the consideration of signaling. Prediction 4 states that if managers decrease the degree of dilution after stronger transitory shocks for rational reasons, their firms will perform better than or at least as well as otherwise identical IPOs; on the other hand, if such a dilution change is the result of overconfidence, the IPO will have poorer long-run performance. To test Prediction 4, I run the following cross-sectional regressions:
where the independent variables of interest are the change in the degree of dilution (∆Dilute) and its interactions with transitory shocks (∆Dilute · T shock).
The columns (3)-(5) in Table 3 show that the IPO firm whose manager decides to dilute less during the book-building period underperforms the benchmark more severely than otherwise identical IPOs. Interestingly, the effect of the dilution change on the long-run performance is more pronounced as transitory shocks are stronger. Note that
, where δ captures the average effect of the dilution change on the long-run performance and ν (µ) captures its additional effects proportional to the strength of transitory (permanent) shocks. The significantly positiveδ andν k (for some k) means that managers who decrease the degree of dilution during the book-building period have poorer long-run performance and this underperformance is even more severe when transitory shocks are stronger before the offering. For example, if a manager decides to decrease the degree of dilution by 10%p during the book-building period, the three-year holding period return of the firm is lower than otherwise identical IPOs by 3.71%p on average. If two consecutive quarters of one standard deviation transitory shocks have occurred before the offering, the firm suffers from additional underperformance by 9.67%p
25 . The interactions with permanent shocks, on the other hand, have insignificant effects on the long-run performance. These results imply that the change in the degree of dilution is likely to be the result of managerial overconfidence rather than the consideration of signaling.
26 In sum, these findings show that permanent shocks and transitory shocks have distinguished effects on managers' expectations and that stronger transitory shocks tend to make managers overconfident, which subsequently leads to long-run underperformance.
Industry-wide Analyses
To take a closer look and to check the robustness of the tests, I repeat the tests in the previous subsection using industry-wide data instead of market-wide data. Since the industry-wide analyses allow heterogeneous effects of the shocks across different industries, they can reveal some industry-specific effects that are obscure in the marketwide analyses. Following Fama and French (1997) , I consider four groups of industries: high technology (HT ), manufacturing (M AN U F ), health care (HLT H) and consumer goods (CNSMR). 27 Industry-wide IPO volume is computed from the number of IPOs and public firms in each group of industries. Industry-wide permanent and transitory shocks are estimated from the industry-wide dividends and stock prices. As the measure of long-run performance, I compute the industry-adjusted three-year holding period return by subtracting the industry return from each IPO's holding period return.
To test Prediction 1 using the industry-wide data, I run the following regressions:
where the subscription j indicates each group of industries. Except for the dependent variables and the new industry-wide shocks, other control variables are the same as in the market-wide tests. Table 5 shows that stronger transitory shocks still lead to higher IPO volume in all industries, but the magnitude and significance of the shock are heterogeneous across industries. For example, in the high technology industries, where transitory shocks have the strongest effects on IPO volume, a one standard deviation transitory shock increases the total number of high tech public firms by 0.47% over a year after the shock. The industry-wide tests also clearly reveal the effects of permanent shocks, which are obscure in the market-wide tests. In all industries except for the health care industries, stronger permanent shocks do lead to higher IPO volume. The effect is the strongest in the high technology industries. That is, managers in the high technology industries react most responsively to stronger permanent shocks by going public soon after the shock. This makes sense because in the high technology industries, during the book-building period. They state that the negative effect, if any, that existing shareholders try to conceal does not lead to poorer aftermarket performance (p.2630). 27 There are in fact five groups of industries: the four groups I consider and the others. I don't include the industries of the others because they contain a substantial number of financial industries, which most IPO literature excludes from analyses. new technologies are presumably perishable in that they can be quickly disseminated and lose profitability. I test Prediction 2 by running the following industry-wide cross-sectional regressions:
The industry-wide analyses present a clearer relationship between shocks and IPO longrun performance. Table 6 shows that in the high technology and health care industries, firms that go public following stronger transitory shocks exhibit more severe underperformance in the long run than otherwise identical IPOs. For example, in the high technology (health care) industries, a single standard deviation transitory shock in the offering quarter leads the IPOs to lower long-run performance by 10.76%p (11.43%p).
On the other hand, such IPOs in the manufacturing and consumer goods industries perform similarly to other IPOs. These findings reveal that the severe underperformance of IPOs that 'time' the transitory shocks is concentrated in some groups of industries, rather than widespread over all industries. The results imply that transitory shockdriven IPOs in the manufacturing and consumer goods industries are likely to be smart IPOs, whereas such IPOs in the high technology and health care industries are likely to be opportunistic IPOs. Now, I analyze the effect of the shocks on managers' expectations in the industry level. I test Prediction 3 and 4 using the following industry-wide multinomial logit regressions and the above cross-sectional regressions, respectively: Table 7 shows that in all industries, transitory shocks in the first regression have significantly positive (or insignificant) coefficients, while those in the second regression have significantly negative (or insignificant) coefficients. The coefficients mean that after stronger transitory shocks, the probability of diluting less becomes greater while the probability of diluting more becomes smaller. In other words, stronger transitory shocks make managers more likely to dilute less. As for the long-run performance, the rows of ∆Dilute and ∆Dilute·T shock in Table 6 show that the IPOs that decrease the degree of dilution further have poorer long-run performance than otherwise identical IPOs. As in the market-wide analyses, the findings support the hypothesis that managers are more prone to become overconfident following stronger transitory shocks and the managers who become overconfident exhibit poorer performance than otherwise identical rational managers. Interestingly, however, the extent to which overconfidence affects the longrun performance is heterogeneous across industries. In the high technology industries, the dilution change has a constant effect regardless of the strength of transitory shocks.
On the other hand, in other industries, the effect of the dilution change is proportional to the strength of transitory shocks. In sum, industry-wide analyses demonstrate the robustness of the tests, and reveal the role of transitory shocks more clearly than market-wide analyses. The results show that the effects of transitory shocks are universal across different industries but stronger in some industries than in the others. In short, stronger transitory shocks induce more firms to go public; the transitory shock-driven IPOs underperform more severely in some industries; managers tend to reduce the size of secondary offering after stronger transitory shocks; such managers exhibit more severe long-run underperformance; and the effects of transitory shocks are more pronounced in the high technology industries than the other industries. The susceptibility of the high technology industries can be due to the unique feature of the industries. Since presumably uncertainty is higher and exact assessment of firms value is more challenging in the high technology industries, managers opportunistic decisions on going public may not be easily detected by investors and managers are apt to mistakenly become overconfident.
Concluding Remarks
Transitory shocks play significant roles in equity financing. Although transitory shocks only fluctuate stock prices of firms without affecting their eventual value, the shocks provide managers incentives and opportunities to make transitory shock-driven decisions on equity financing. Despite the economic significance of transitory shocks, there has been little emphasis to distinguish transitory shocks from permanent ones in corporate finance literature. Rather, most literature has implicitly assumed high or low valuation in the stock market on which managers' decision-making is based would be transitory. However, we need to separately analyze the role of permanent and transitory shocks in order to better understand the actual practice of equity financing and to determine which competing hypotheses are more consistent with reality.
In this paper, I decompose shocks in the stock market into permanent and transi-tory shocks using cointegration analyses. The decomposed shocks effectively differentiate transitory market movements from permanent ones, and provide richer information about stock market valuation than other commonly used valuation measures. Using the decomposed shocks, I examine how transitory shocks affect managers' decision on going public and their expectations on their firms' prospects. I also examine what implications the transitory shocks have on IPO long-run performance. I find that despite the lack of long-run effects on firms' value, more firms go public in response to stronger transitory shocks; firms that go public after stronger transitory shocks underperform the benchmark more severely than otherwise identical IPOs; managers are more likely to limit secondary share sales after stronger transitory shocks; and managers who limit secondary share sales further during the book-building period exhibit more severe longrun underperformance. The findings are consistent with the hypotheses that stronger transitory shocks induce disproportionally more IPOs that simply attempt to exploit temporarily high market valuation than IPOs that try to meet their capital demand in better market conditions, and that stronger transitory shocks are more likely to make managers overconfident and the resulting overconfidence leads to more severe long-run underperformance. These effects of transitory shocks are more pronounced in the industries in which presumably uncertainty is higher and exact valuation of firms is more difficult. This study contributes to corporate finance literature in several ways. Most importantly, this paper provides a novel framework for empirical corporate finance. Note that the decomposition of permanent and transitory shocks used in this paper can be applied to most corporate finance decision-making such as mergers & acquisitions and investments to see the role of permanent and transitory shocks. The methodology can also be applied to international data to examine the possibility that transitory shocks have heterogeneous effects across different countries. Presumably, the shocks have less adverse effects in the financially more developed countries. This paper also sheds light on managerial overconfidence by suggesting a new measure of managerial overconfidence and its potential origin. I empirically show that managers are more likely to behave as if they were overconfident after stronger transitory shocks. This finding provides a channel through which managers' expectations are affected by macroeconomic shocks and suggests that transitory shocks in the stock market could be a potential source of managerial overconfidence. In addition, the findings enhance our understanding regarding the stylized facts in IPOs: IPO waves and long-run IPO underperformance. This paper adds a complementary explanation for the stylized facts to existing literature by showing the transitory shocks significantly account for both IPO waves and IPO long-run underperformance.
As a final note, I want to emphasize that the findings of this paper have implications for investors, policy makers, and managers. Investors should beware of managers' opportunistic attempt to go public especially after stronger transitory shocks and in industries where uncertainty is higher. While in the consumer goods and manufacturing industries, transitory shock-driven IPOs are likely to be smart firms that finance profitable projects in favorable market conditions, such IPOs in the high technology and health care industries are likely to be opportunists. Since it is difficult to distinguish good firms from bad firms especially in such industries, investors should be careful of investing in high tech or health care IPOs. The findings about long-run IPO performance could help to form a potentially profitable investment strategy.
For policy makers, this research can be used to foster a vibrant and sound IPO market. IPOs have been an important creator of economic value as a whole, but not all IPOs end up surviving as successful business. A substantial number of IPOs turn out to be opportunistic. Severe asymmetric information between issuers and investors makes these opportunistic IPOs possible and leads suboptimal amount of investment to IPOs. This paper identifies time and industries in which opportunistic IPOs are particularly likely or unlikely, and therefore if we publish and popularize permanent and transitory shocks and their effects, it could possibly alleviate the severe asymmetry of information and help to reduce the deadweight loss.
Managers should also beware of becoming overconfident under the influence of transitory shocks. It is not only investors but also managers themselves who can be fooled by stronger transitory shocks in the stock market. In industries in which investors find exact valuation difficult, managers are also subject to making mistakes. Since managers who become overconfident due to transitory shocks exhibit more severe underperformance than rational managers, in order to be successful managers, they should always exercise due caution.
Appendix A
This appendix section presents a simple two-stage model that demonstrates the effects of permanent and transitory shocks on managers' decisions on going public and the degree of dilution.
Let Proceeds be the total amount of money raised through an IPO and Dividends be the amount of dividends per a unit of ownership. Pshock and Tshock are permanent and transitory shocks, respectively, and Dil is a measure of the degree of dilution (0 < Dil < 1). OC and IO represent measures of managerial overconfidence and the benefit from investment opportunities, respectively. Finally, U is the utility of going public that managers maximize. Then, the assumptions stated verbally in Section 2 can be restated as follows: 
Decision on Going Public
In the first stage, managers decide to go public if the utility of going public is greater than a reservation utility, U * . Permanent and transitory shocks influence the utility of going public as follows:
Note that the utility of going public always increases following a stronger transitory shock ( ∂U ∂T shock > 0). After a permanent shock, however, the utility may or may not increase depending on the cost of ownership dilution and the benefit of going public from additional investment opportunities. Unless additional investment opportunities are sufficiently appealing (c 4 ∂IO ∂P shock 0), the utility does not necessarily increase after a stronger permanent shock. Since the higher the utility is, the more likely it is to hit the threshold, IPO volume is expect to increase after a stronger transitory shock. In contrast, there is no clear prediction about IPO volume after a stronger permanent shock. Therefore, we obtain Prediction 1.
Decision on the Degree of Dilution
Given the decision to go public, the degree of dilution through the IPO is optimally determined as follows:
The issuance size corresponding to the optimal degree of dilution is filed with the SEC.
29 The second-order condition is satisfied by A 3.
During the book-building period, managers may revise the issue size after permanent and/or transitory shocks as the shocks can change the optimal degree of dilution. For rational managers (OC ≡ 0), it is always optimal to increase the degree of dilution after a stronger transitory shock:
On the other hand, some overconfident managers (c 3 ∂OC ∂T shock 0) may find it more beneficial to decrease the degree of dilution after a stronger transitory shock:
As for a permanent shock, the directions are less decisive due to the term of Dividends. Prediction 3 derives from the above arguments.
Appendix B
This appendix section describes the cointegration tests and presents the estimation results of the VECM. Note that cointegration is essential for the Granger representation theorem to hold, which is the ground for decomposition. First, I test the hypotheses of a unit root for the time series of log dividends (d t ) and log stock prices (p t ) using the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. The length of the lags in the ADF tests is obtained by the criterion in Campbell and Perron (1991) . Table A1 presents the test results for the variables under consideration. The first (second) column shows that the hypothesis that the level of log dividends (log stock prices) has a unit root cannot be rejected at the significance level of 10%. As for the first-differenced time series, however, the unit root hypotheses are rejected at the 5% significance level as shown in the third and the fourth columns. Having checked that both log dividends and log stock prices follow the I(1) process, I estimate a cointegrating vector, α = (1, −α) , to test the unit root hypothesis of the cointegrating error. The estimation is implemented using a dynamic least-squares procedure: d t = Const.+αp t + K j=−K β j ∆p t−j + t . I use eight leads and lags of the first differences of log prices in the dynamic least-squares regression (K = 8) as in Lettau and Ludvigson (2004) . Note that the estimate,α, is super-consistent, which eliminates potential problems that may arise when an estimated value is used as an explanatory variable in regressions. The estimated cointegrating vector is (1, −0.7388)
. Then I test the unit root hypothesis for the cointegrating error, d t − 0.7388p t , using the residual based cointegration test (Phillips and Ouliaris, 1990) . The final column of Table A1 shows that at the significance level of 1%, the hypothesis that the cointegrating error has a unit root is rejected, which confirms that dividends and stock prices are indeed cointegrated.
Using the estimated cointegrating vector, I fit the data of log dividends and log stock prices to the VECM with two lags of the first differences. Longer lags add more wiggles to the short-run impulse response functions but have little effect on the long-run behaviors of the variables. The estimation results are tabulated in Table A2 . Consistent with the impulse responses, stock prices play a significant role in correcting the cointegrating error. The resulting decomposition matrix G is [0.8785, 0.4777; −1, 0.7388]. Since stock prices move in the direction that corrects the error rather than evolve autonomously, the matrix G assigns small weight (0.4777) to price innovations in forming permanent shocks. In contrast, dividend innovations have large weight (0.8785) as dividend innovations are more autonomous and less reverted later.
One may argue that the cointegrating vector should be (1, −1) . The log-linearization of a gross return indeed implies that log dividends and log stock prices are cointegrated with the cointegrating vector of (1, −1) (Campbell and Shiller, 1988) . Although actual data of dividend-price ratios are shown to be non-stationary and incompatible with this theory-based cointegrating vector, (1, −1)
is still crucial for studies on return predictability because any cointegrating vectors other than (1, −1)
are not compatible with the definition of a return and would not yield correct returns. However, the purpose of my research is not to predict returns. Rather, the goal is to estimate how much of fluctuations in prices and dividends come from transitory shocks as opposed to permanent shocks. As long as the two time series are empirically shown to be cointegrated with any cointegrating vector, the decomposition technique can be applied. It is a pure econometric technique, which doesn't require any underlying theory for the considered time series (Gonzalo and Ng, 2001) . In sum, although we cannot predict returns based on the "wrong" cointegrating vector, (1, −α), we can still decompose the permanent and transitory shocks.
The non-stationary dividend-price ratios can arise for several reasons: speculative bubbles, investing fads, a narrow measure of dividends excluding other forms of cash distributions such as share repurchases and merger distributions, and the omission of other relevant variables such as retained earnings (MacDonald and Power, 1995) . In addition, Parlour, Stanton, and Walden (2011) recently show that price-dividend ratios can be explosive as dividends increase even without any bubbles. Lastly, the gradual decrease in the proportion of dividend payers can be a reason for the non-stationary dividend-price ratios. Fama and French (2001) show that the proportion of dividend payers in NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ firms falls from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999, and explain that the decline is in part due to an increasing tilt of publicly traded firms toward the characteristics of firms that typically have never paid dividends. This finding implies that market-wide dividend-price ratios has fallen due to an influx of non-paying firms and the resulting increase in the total market capitalization. This finding is consistent with the notion that the market-wide log dividends and log prices are cointegrated with a cointegrating vector of (1, −α)
, where α < 1. 1960Q1 -2010Q4 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Note: The figures depict the log dividends and log prices (times 100) of the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ composite index. The data are generated as follows. First, the gross return of the index with and without dividends (RETD and RETX, respectively) are obtained from the CRSP. Without loss of generality, set the price of the index to 1 in 1926Q1. Then the subsequent prices and dividends are determined by the following formulas: P t+1 = P t · RET X t+1 and 1960Q1 -2010Q4 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1960Q1 -2010Q4 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1960Q1 -2010Q4 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Note: The figure plots quarterly IPO volume. IPO volume is the number of IPOs in a quarter deflated by the number of public firms (in thousands) at the previous quarter.
Table 1. Summary statistics
The tables show the summary statistics of variables collected from the Securities Data Company (SDC), the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat. ADRs, CEFs, REITs, and unit issues are excluded from the sample. Observations without valid information are dropped. Panel A shows cross-sectional statistics of the U.S. common share-IPOs. HPR3 is the 3-year buy-and-hold return of an IPO firm. It is measured as a net return computed from the first price record in CRSP and the price of its 756 trading days. If the firm is delisted before its third anniversary, the price on the delisting date is used instead. VW3 is the 3-year return of the value-weighted market portfolio over the same period as each IPO firm. MHPR is the market-adjusted holding period return and computed as the difference between HPR3 and VW3. OfferPrice is the price at which new shares are issued and Day1Price is the first price recorded in CRSP. InitialRet is the net return computed from the OfferPrice and Day1Price. SharesOffered, PrmOffered, and SecOffered are the numbers of total, primary, and secondary shares offered in the IPO, respectively, and reported in thousands. Similarly, SharesFiled, PrmFiled, and SecFiled are the numbers of total, primary, and secondary shares initially filed with the SEC, respectively, and also reported in thousands. PropSec is the proportion of the secondary shares filed in the total shares filed. Proceeds is the amount of money raised through the IPO reported in million dollars. Shrout is the shares outstanding after the IPO reported in thousands, and MarketCap is the market capitalization at the issuance reported in million dollars. Dilute A (Dilute P ) is the actual (planned) dilution of original shareholders, which is computed from the number of shares filed (offered).
Dilute is the difference between Dilute A and Dilute P . DiluteMore (DiluteLess) is a dummy variable equal to one if the Dilute is positive (negative). DLST is a dummy variable equal to one if the IPO stock is delisted within three years since the public offering. HT is a dummy variable equal to one if the industry of the IPO is classified as the high-tech industry. MANUF, HLTH and CNSMR are dummy variables indicating the industries of manufacturing, health and consumer goods, respectively. The classification is based on the four-digit SIC code. is the growth rate of real sales from quarter t-1 to quarter t+3, averaged across all firms recorded in Compustat. RealMktRet t is the real return on the equally weighted market index at quarter t. FtrRealMktRet t+1, t+4 is the compound real return on the equally weighted market index over one year subsequent to the IPO. PastRealMktRet t-3, t-1 is the real return on the equally weighted market index over three quarters prior to the IPO. CEFD t is the discount on closed-end funds at quarter t. MtoB t is the market-tobook ratio averaged across all firms in Compustat with equal weights. InitialRet t is the return on the first trading day, averaged across all IPOs listed at quarter t. Q1 t is a dummy variable equal to one if quarter t is the first calendar quarter of each year. Recession t is a dummy variable equal to one if quarter t is classified as recession by NBER. d t and p t are the log transformation of dividends and prices of value-weighted market index. The price of the index in 1926Q1 is normalized to 1. d t and p t are the first differences of d t and p t , respectively. Pshock t (Tshock t ) is defined as the structural shock that has permanent (transitory) level effects on dividends and stock prices, and estimated using the vector error-correction model (VECM) as in Lettau and Ludvigson (2004, AER IPOs deflated by the number of public firms (in thousands) at the end of the previous quarter, and the explanatory variables include the permanent and transitory shocks. All other variable definitions are identical to those described in Table 1 .
The number in the parenthesis is the Newey-West corrected standard error. All regressions take the residual serial correlation into account by including the lagged value of the dependent variable.
(1 (SURs) . The dependent variable is the industry-wide IPO volume, the number of quarterly IPOs in each group of industries deflated by the number of public firms (in thousands) in the industries at the end of previous quarter. The permanent and transitory shocks are specific to each group of industries in the sense that the shocks are estimated from dividends and stock prices in each group of industries. The SURs take into account the possibility that the error terms in each group of industries are correlated one another. All other variable definitions are identical to those described in Table 1 .
The number in the parenthesis is the corresponding standard error. All regressions take the residual serial correlation into account by including the lagged value of the dependent variable.
(1) HT (2) (Tshock i,j,-k ) is the permanent (transitory) shock specific to the industries j from k quarters prior to the IPO. All other variable definitions are identical to those described in Table 1 This table tabulates the results of multinomial logit regressions that show the effects on the permanent and transitory shocks on the probability of changing the post-IPO ownership relative to maintaining the status quo during the book-building period. The dependent variable is a set of categories (DiluteLess, DiluteMore and DiluteSame), which indicates the changes in the post-IPO ownership. Pshock i,j,-k (Tshock i,j,-k ) is the permanent (transitory) shock specific to the industries j that occurred k quarters prior to the IPO. All other variable definitions are identical to those described in Table 1 . This table reports the results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. and denote log dividends and log prices of the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ composite index, respectively. The sample period is from 1948Q1 to 2010Q4. The null hypothesis for each test is that the considered time series has a unit root. The length of the lags in the ADF tests is obtained by criterion in Campbell and Perron (1991) . Critical values assume tests for a unit root with drift. The critical value for the estimated cointegrating error (Column 5) is obtained from Phillips and Ouliaris (1990 
